State of Utah v. William Horton : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. William Horton : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul R. Van Dam; Utah State Attorney General; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Alan M. Williams; Attorney at Law; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Horton, No. 920245 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3171
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
•A10 Q„ 
DOCKET NO i^QZ-H:T 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM HORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920245-CA 
Category No. 
Priority No. , % 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District 
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge. 
Paul R. Van Dam 
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Alan M. Williams (3478) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
365 West 50 North, #W4 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
^«** IPlt CSsm fe-as $L»** 
JUB8G t W 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM HORTON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920245-CA 
Category No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District 
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge. 
Paul R. Van Dam 
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Alan M. Williams 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
365 West 50 North, #W4 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
OFFICER JOE BOREN AND THE POLICE 
OFFICERS WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM COULD RELY 
IN GOOD FAITH ON THE DEFECTIVE WARRANT 
WHICH WAS ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
COURT 9 
POINT II: THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE 
TESTIMONY OF HARMON MEINHART BY WAY OF 
AFFIDAVIT WHEN THE AFFIANT WAS DECEASED 
AND THERE WERE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF 
RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS TO 
ADMISSION 
WARRANT 
13 
POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
CONTINUE THE TRIAL IN ORDER THAT A 
CRUCIAL DEFENSE WITNESS COULD RECUPERATE 
SUFFICIENTLY TO ATTEND TRIAL. . . 16 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE 
TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT 
NUMBER 25, A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TRUNK OF 
THE CAR ALLEGEDLY USED TO TRANSPORT THE 
STOLEN PROPERTY 17 
POINT V: THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT 
TO SEVEN CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS AND A 
CONSECUTIVE JAIL SENTENCE 19 
CONCLUSION 20 
-l-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 96 L. Ed. 631, 1987 14 
People v. Loscutoff, 661 P. 2d 274 (Colo., 1983) . . . . 19 
People v. Mattas, 618 P. 2d 675 (Colo., 1980) 19 
State v. Buck. 756 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1988) 12 
State v. Gray. 717 P. 2d 1313 (Utah 1986) 19 
State v. Kendia. 666 P 2d. 233 (Kansas, 1983) 19 
State v. Laffertv. 749 P 2d. 1239, (Utah 1988) 18 
State v. Larocco. 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990) 12 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) 12 
State v. Montes. 667 P. 2d 191 (Ariz. 1983) 18 
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) 10 
State v. Shearer. 793 P.2d 86 (Ariz. App, 1989) . . . . 15 
State v. Swapp. 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1991) 20 
United States v. Benfield. 593 F. 2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) 15, 16 
United States v. Freitas. 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985) 11 
United States v. Leon. 82 L.Ed 2d 677 (1984) . . . . 10, 11 
STATUTES 
Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code 19 
Section 76-8-501, Utah Code 14 
Section 76-8-502, Utah Code 14 
OTHER 
Rule 804 (b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence 13 
Rule 806, Utah Rules of Evidence 14 
-ii-
IN THE COURT APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
T,TTT TAM HORTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF" UTAH, 
Appel1ee, 
Case No. 920 2 45 CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 
Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2) (t), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REV IJEW 
1. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that police 
o f f i c e r s a c t e d i n q o o d ii ait h 111 t h e i i: e x e c u t i o n o f t h e d e f e c t i v e 
:. eat oli wa i i i ri* i '.\ - I M t le* Th.i J d CI r c m ! C'oui; I. , 
2 . D i d t h e t r i a l court w r o n g l y e x c l u d e t he t e s t i m o n y b y 
affidavit of Harmon Meinhait, deceased. 
3 I) i d 11 i e 11: i a ] c o i 11 t w t o n g 1 y i: e f u s € • a c ' o n t :i i 11 ;i a i l c e t c a ] 1 o w 
C1 a ra E va Me i nhar t a v i t a1 a1i bi w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y i n pe r son. 
4 . hi d t he t i I d I wi oiig J y i e t u s e t o accep t defendant f s 
y I," u p o s e c t e x h i i > i I hi uinl ^j i "] 4 d y \ n »L i iy L a p t i 111 I I i c I i i m 11 f I h e 
vehicle alleged to have been used in transportinq 1 he allegedly 
stolen property. 
5. Did the trial court wrongly sentence the defendant to 
consecutive terms in the excess of the thirty year statutory 
limitation. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant was charged on July 10, 1991 in a ten count 
information alleging as follows: 
Count I, Theft, a second degree felony. 
Count II, Burglary, a third degree felony. 
Count III, Burglary, a third degree felony. 
Count IV, Theft, a third degree felony. 
Count V, Burglary, a third degree felony. 
Count VI, Theft a third degree felony. 
Count VII, Burglary, a third degree felony. 
Count VIII, Theft, a third degree felony. 
Count IX, Burglary, a third degree felony. 
Count X, Theft a second degree felony. 
2. After preliminary hearing on the 23rd and 26th of July, 
1992, all counts were bound over for trial except that count one 
which alleged that the defendant was a habitual criminal was 
amended to delete that portion of the allegation. Count six was 
amended to reflect a charge of theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
3. Following arraignment, counts one and two were severed 
from counts three through ten. Separate trials were scheduled for 
the two criminal incidents which were alleged. 
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4 . H e a r i :i i g w a s h e ] d :> n N o v e in b e :i • 7 1 h ] 9 91 o n d efendant's 
mot: on to quash a search, warrant whi ch had 1: ieen issued in. the Third 
Circuit Cour t i n and for Salt Lake County, and to suppress all 
e v i d e n c e w h i c h w a s s e a z e d p \ i. r s i :i a n t t • : • 1 1 i a. t w a r :i : a n t T h e t r :i a 1 
c o u i: t r i 11 e d t h a t t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t w a s i n v a, 1 i d b u t r e f u s e d t o 
suppress the e v i d e n c e s e i z e d r e l y i n g on t h e "good f a i t h 1 1 e x c e p t i o n 
In it h e e x i luMuiidi y i. u 1 v , ( F" i n d :i r I g s o I F a c t. a n d 0 o n c "1 u s i. o n s i' 11 I.«. J W ) 
5, Defendant was acquitted at trial on counts one and two, 
6 T r i a. 1 w a s set f o i I) e c embe r 5th and 6th, 19 9 J on c o un t s 
three through ten On December b t h a m i:; •  1 t x a 1 was iU*c 1 a red . 
Tr i a 1 wa.s r e- s et £ or December 191 h and 2 0 of ] 9 9 ] t »* 11 was 
\mfinued when a defense alibi witness, Clar a Eva Meinhar t had 
s u r g e i y a n d wa1.. u n a v a i l a b l e f o r trial T h e t:i : ial court ordered the 
trial re set for January 2nd and 3rd of 1992 . The t r ial cour t 
i : e f i I s e d £ i 11: t in e i: c o i 11 :i i 11 I a n c e a. n d o i: d e r e d t h a. t a d e p o s i t i o n b e taken 
of Mrs, Meinhar t * s testimony for use at tr i al, 
7. Trial was held on counts three through ten on January 2rd 
a, n d 31: d , 1 9 9 2 b e f o r e a j i i1 : j F o 11 o w i n g a i r e r d i c t c • f g i :i 1 1 1 y c:»n a I, !. 
coun 1:s by the jur} defendant was sentenced to ser ved one tern t of 
one to f i ft. een years and si x term of i ip to five years at the Utah 
S t a. t e P i: i s o i I a. 1 o i i g \ i i 11 :t. a s :i x n i o n 11 i t e i: n: i a t 11: i e U i i 11 a h C o i :i n, 1: j J a :i 1 
sai d terms to be served, consecutive!y , 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
T h i L i s in dpp(.-\.il I i Miii, .1 t i n a J yudgir*-' * : j o n i e i nf I h e 
Eighth District Court of Uintah County finding • :- •- defendant gui lty 
0£ o n e c o u n t of Theft, a second degree feiuuj, xii violation of 
3 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated, two counts 
of Theft, third degree felonies in violation of the same section, 
one count of Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of the same 
section, and four counts of Burglary of a non-dwelling, third 
degree felonies in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended. The Court issued its Judgment and 
Order on February 19, 1992. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 
March 20, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On the night of June 16th into the 17th of 1991, a grocery 
store near Vernal, Utah was burglarized. (TR. 96-97) Items valued 
in excess of $1000.00 were also stolen. (TR. 109) Entry appeared 
to have been accomplished by the removal of an air conditioner. 
(TR. 150) 
2. The same night, a building containing several businesses 
in Vernal was also broken into. (TR. 122) Items valued in excess 
of $250.00 were taken from the "Dinah Bowl" (TR. 124) and the 
"Acute Cut" beauty salon. (TR. 137) Items valued at less than 
$100.00 were taken from the "Dinah Barber Shop." (TR. 145) Entry 
appeared to have been accomplished through a hole in the roof of 
the building where an air conditioner had been removed. (TR. 172-
173) 
3. Following a series of phone calls between Vernal City 
police officer Joe Boren and an unidentified informant, officer 
Boren prepared an affidavit for search warrant and presented it to 
a magistrate of the Third Circuit Court in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
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July 10, 1991. (Findings 3, 5, 6, and 10) The magistrate signed 
the search warrant. 
4. Shortly thereafter Officer Boren, accompanied by several 
police officers from Uintah County, Duchesne County, the United 
States Forest Service, and Salt Lake City executed the warrant at 
the defendant's residence in Salt Lake City. (TR. 179-180) The 
officers from Uintah County and the Forest Service were 
specifically looking for evidence from burglaries which had not 
been mentioned in the affidavit for search warrant nor in the 
warrant itself. (Finding 15) 
5. Various items of stolen property identified as being 
stolen during the burglaries were found at the defendant's 
residence as well as tools later identified by a co-defendant as 
being used in the burglaries. (TR. 180-183) 
6. At about the same time, a search warrant was issued by the 
Eighth Circuit Court in Uintah County for the residence in Vernal 
of one Brian Winslow, an individual also identified to Officer 
Boren during the phone calls from the informant. Various items of 
property from the burglaries were also found at his residence. 
(TR.288) 
7. The defendant and Mr. Winslow were arrested on July 11, 
1991 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Circuit Court. 
8. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized 
pursuant to the search warrant based on a defect in the affidavit. 
The affidavit summarized information received from an informant 
that the defendant had been seen in possession of stolen property 
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and that he had been heard discussing burglaries in Vernal. There 
was nothing in the affidavit which stated when or where the stolen 
item had been seen. The affidavit did state that the defendant 
lived at a certain location but said nothing about any evidence 
being seen there. (Affidavit) 
9. Officer Boren described himself as an experienced 
investigator who had prepared or assisted in the drafting of at 
least two hundred search warrant affidavits. He was familiar with 
the necessity not only to specify why the evidence sought in a 
search warrant should be seized, but also the necessity to state 
the evidence showing why the specified location should be searched. 
Officer Boren also presented the warrant to the magistrate and 
directed the execution of the warrant. (Finding 14) 
10. The Court ruled that the warrant was invalid due to its 
failure to present any evidence providing probable cause as to the 
location of any evidence. (Conclusion 1) It did find Officer 
Boren had evidence that may have shown probable cause as to the 
location of the evidence, but that the officer intentionally 
withheld that evidence from the magistrate thereby taking the risk 
that the warrant might not issue. (Findings 12, 13, 17 and 18) 
With that finding, the court ruled that Officer Boren acted in good 
faith reliance on the warrant once it had been signed. (Conclusion 
3) The court did not make any specific finding of objective good 
faith on the part of the officer. 
11. The evidence presented at the trial by the state 
consisted of the testimony of the victims, the testimony of the 
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officers who investigated the crime scenes, the testimony of Brian 
Winslow, a co-defendant offered a reduction in charges in exchange 
for testimony, and the items seized during the execution of the 
search warrant at the defendant's home. 
12. The defendant presented alibi evidence from three 
witnesses. The defendant offered alibi evidence in the form of an 
affidavit from Harmon Meinhart, the father in law of the defendant, 
which had been signed and sworn to on August 12, 1992. (TR. 8) 
Mr. Meinhart had died in early November, 1992. Alibi evidence was 
presented by the reading of a deposition from Clara Eva Meinhart, 
the mother in law of the defendant. (TR. 324-340) Mrs. Meinhart 
had been present for the initial trial which ended in a mistrial, 
but underwent surgery on or about December 16, 1992. The Court 
allowed a continuance of the December 19 trial date so that the 
deposition could take place, but refused any continuance after the 
2nd of January 1992. 
13. The defendant proposed exhibit number 25 as evidence in 
his defense. The proposed exhibit consisted of a photograph of the 
trunk of the car alleged to have been used to transport the stolen 
property with a hubcap propped up in the trunk to show scale. A 
proper foundation was laid as to the time of the photograph, the 
photographer, and the true and accurate portrayal of the items 
contained in the photograph. (TR. 309-310) Upon the state's 
objection the Court refused to admit the photograph on the basis 
that the bottom of the hubcap was not in the photo and therefore 
it might be possible that the photograph did not accurately show 
7 
the size of the trunk. (TR.311) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant claims error by the trial judge in ruling that the 
good faith exception applied despite the officer's subjective 
acknowledgement that the affidavit for search warrant did not 
contain facts sufficient to establish probable cause. Further, 
the trial court did not make finding of good faith reliance based 
on an objective standard. 
Secondly, appellant claims error in that the court refused to 
allow the evidence of a deceased alibi witness when there were 
sufficient indicia of reliability and truthfulness presented to 
allow admission under the residual hearsay exception. 
Thirdly, appellant claims that error was compounded when the 
companion testimony of the deceased's wife was made available to 
the jury only by deposition due to the court failure to allow a 
continuance sufficient for her to recover to the point of being 
able to travel. 
Fourthly, appellant claims error in that the court wrongly 
excluded admissible photographic evidence which would have shown 
the impossibility of the events testified to by the co-defendants. 
Finally, appellant claims error in that the court ignored a 
statutory limit of thirty years on consecutive sentencing on cases 
arising out of one incident by sentencing the defendant to forty 
five possible years in the penitentiary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT OFFICER JOE BOREN AND THE 
POLICE OFFICERS WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM COULD RELY IN GOOD FAITH ON THE 
DEFECTIVE WARRANT WHICH WAS ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, 
On July 8th and 9th, 1991, Officer Joe Boren received a series 
of telephone calls from an informant. (Findings 3, 5, 6, 7, and 
9) The as yet unidentified informant told officer Boren that she 
had information about burglaries in Vernal and Duchesne. The 
informant described and named the defendant and an individual she 
believed was from Vernal. The informant described seeing some 
property which matched the description of what had been taken in 
from the Dinah Bowl building in Vernal. (Finding 5) After some 
investigation by the police driver's license records, an address 
in the Rose Park area of Salt Lake City was obtained for the 
defendant. (Finding 4) Those facts were presented to a magistrate 
in Salt Lake City by Officer Boren and a search warrant was issued 
for the search of the defendant's residence. (Finding 10) With the 
assistance of some Salt Lake City police officers, a Duchesne 
County deputy, a Uintah County deputy, and a United States Forest 
Service enforcement officer, Officer Boren directed the execution 
of the search warrant. He knew that the Uintah County deputy and 
the forest service officer had accompanied him for the specific 
purpose of searching for evidence which would assist in solving 
other burglaries each was investigating, burglaries which had not 
been mentioned in the affidavit for search warrant. (Finding 15) 
The search warrant was ruled to be invalid in that the affidavit 
prepared by Officer Boren gave the magistrate no evidence to find 
9 
probable cause that the evidence sought was in the location for 
which the warrant was sought. (Conclusion 1) 
It has been a longstanding rule in this country that when 
evidence is obtained through the use of an invalid search warrant, 
that evidence will be excluded from use in any trial. The United 
States Supreme Court carved out an exception to that rule in the 
case of United States v. Leon, 82 L.Ed 2d 677 (1984). The Court 
ruled that the exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring unlawful 
police conduct, does not bar evidence seized by officers acting in 
good faith reliance on a defective warrant. The rule has 
limitations. The officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-
cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of a warrant 
must be objectively reasonable. Reliance would not be justified 
in cases where the warrant was issued on an affidavit "so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable." U.S. v. Leon, supra, at p. 699. 
This court has elaborated on the applicability of that rule and its 
exceptions in the case of State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 
1991). In that case, this court ruled that there was nothing in 
the warrant in question that would provide any basis for a finding 
of probable cause to issue a nighttime search authorization. The 
court noted that the same officer prepared the affidavit, presented 
it to the magistrate, and executed the warrant. The objective 
standard requires reasonable knowledge of the law by police 
officers. United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 
1985). The Rowe Court, citing Freitas, ruled that since the same 
10 
officer prepared the affidavit, presented it to a magistrate, and 
executed the warrant, there could be no finding of objective good 
faith. 
The logic of the Rowe decision is inescapable in this case as 
well. On an objective level, Officer Boren, if he were to be able 
to rely in good faith on the warrant, must have had knowledge that 
facts must be presented in a search warrant affidavit which provide 
a basis for searching the particular location. Those facts were 
conspicuously absent from the affidavit. An objective officer 
would know that a warrant issued without those facts would be 
defective in its basic probable cause determination. On a 
subjective level as well, the knowledge possessed by Boren leads 
to the same conclusion. Officer Boren stated that he had prepared 
or assisted in the preparation of at least two hundred affidavits 
for search warrants. (Finding 14) He admitted that his training 
in the preparation of affidavits and in the concept of probable 
cause included background in the requirements for that information. 
He admitted that he intentionally omitted that information. 
(Finding 12) In essence he knowingly presented a defective 
affidavit in the hope that the magistrate would not notice the 
defect. He then professes good faith reliance on a warrant that 
he knew was defective. 
The type of reliance which the trial court ruled to be in good 
faith suggests a similar fact situation to that discussed in 
footnote nine of the Rowe decision. The court suggested that if 
an officer presented a defective affidavit to a magistrate and then 
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gave a resulting invalid warrant to another officer to execute 
thereby insulating the execution from the defective issuance, the 
court would have no hesitation in fashioning a remedy. 
While it was not briefed at the trial court, the lack of a 
good faith exception under the Utah exclusionary rule was discussed 
in open court and presumably was considered in the trial court's 
decision. (Hearing TR. 18) No specific finding was made, however. 
(See findings of fact and conslusions of law) At least one member 
of the Utah Supreme Court considered the subject in the case of 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) in the context of an 
automobile search. Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion 
suggested that the issue should be considered. The exclusionary 
rule under state law is more restrictive that under a purely 
federal analysis. See State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
In any event, under a either a state or federal analysis, 
Joe Boren knew or should have known that he presented insufficient 
facts to the magistrate for a finding of probable cause to search 
the defendant's residence. While mere ministerial or technical 
errors in the preparation or execution of a search warrant will not 
necessarily invalidate a warrant, State v. Buck, 756 P. 2d 700 
(Utah 1988) the defect here was not of that nature. The only 
remedy therefore for that defect is exclusion of the evidence 
seized. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY OF HARMON 
MEINHART BY WAY OF AFFIDAVIT WHEN THE AFFIANT WAS DECEASED AND 
THERE WERE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 
TO WARRANT ADMISSION. 
12 
On August 8, 1992, the defendant's father in law, Harmon 
prepared a statement outlining his recollection of the whereabouts 
of his son-in-law, William Horton and his daughter Vickie Horton 
on the night of June 16, 1991, the date which the burglaries and 
thefts apparently occurred. He related that they came home to 
their home adjacent to his in Salt Lake City at about 10:00 or 
10:30 p.m. and were drunk. The statement was subscribed to and 
sworn before a notary public in Salt Lake City on August 12, 1991. 
At the beginning of November, 1991, Mr. Meinhart died. He was thus 
unavailable to testify at trial. The defendant offered the 
statement of Mr. Meinhart at trial based on the residual hearsay 
exception, Rule 804 (b)(5), of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (TR.8) 
The Court declined to accept the evidence, ruling that since the 
decedent's wife, Clara Eva Meinhart was available to testify to 
much of the same recollection, the statement would not be more 
probative than any other evidence that the defendant could procure. 
Rule 804 of the Rules of Evidence allows for the admissibility 
of statements if the declarant is unavailable. Rule 804 (b)(5) 
specifically allows for the admission of: 
"A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. 
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The statement was notarized. It therefore subjected the 
declarant to criminal liability if it were shown not to be true. 
Section 76-8-501 of the Utah Code defines an official proceeding 
to include any proceeding before an official authorized by law to 
take evidence under oath including a notary. A person is guilty 
of a felony of the second degree if he makes a false statement 
under oath in any official proceeding, (Section 76-8-502, Utah 
Code). The reliability of the statement is therefore shown. 
The court must examine whether or not the general purposes of 
the rule and the interests of justice are served by the proffered 
hearsay statement. While the use of a notarized statement does not 
allow for cross-examination by the state of the witness, the state 
does not have the same Constitutional right of confrontation as 
that of the defendant. The state's right is more of a "functional" 
right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding process. 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 96 L. Ed. 631, 1987. The state's right, 
whatever it may be, is not violated when out of court statements 
of an unavailable witness are admitted if the statements bear 
adequate indications of trustworthiness. Kentucky v. Stincer, 
supra. The state further has the right pursuant to rule 806, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, to attack the credibility of the declarant by 
any method which would have been available had the declarant been 
available as a witness. 
The Court, while it made no specific ruling as to either the 
reliability of the statement or the interests of justice, did rule 
that other probative evidence was available, to wit, the testimony 
14 
of Clara Eva Meinhart. Her testimony was not identical that of 
Mr. Meinhart in that she did not see the defendant in Salt Lake 
City on the night of June 16, 1991. She only heard the arguments. 
She believed that she heard the defendant's voice, but it was her 
husband who personally went outside and talked to the defendant. 
(TR. 322-340) 
The erroneous ruling not to admit the notarized statement was 
compounded by the mis-trial and subsequent surgery which Mrs. 
Meinhart underwent. When it came to the actual trial, she was 
unavailable to testify due to her medical condition. Her testimony 
was received only by deposition. The probative value of Mrs. 
Meinhart's testimony was diluted by her failure to testify 
personally. It is at least partially for this reason, this lack 
of face to face contact between a witness and a fact finder that 
depositions may be of dubious value in any criminal case. In the 
Arizona case of State v. Shearer, 793 P.2d 86 (Ariz. App, 1989), 
that court held that a deposition was not admissible at trial even 
as former testimony. In so ruling, the Court cited favorably dicta 
from the case of United States v. Benfield, 593 F. 2d 815 (8th Cir. 
1979) stating that "The right of cross-examination reinforces the 
importance of physical confrontation. Most believe that in some 
undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication 
are influenced by face to face challenge. . . . While a deposition 
necessarily eliminated a face to face meeting between witness and 
jury, we find no further justification for further abridgement of 
the defendant's rights." 
15 
While there may have been some basis for the Court's initial 
ruling of non-admissibility of the statement, its later ruling 
invalidated any rationale for that ruling. The next point of this 
brief is necessarily connected to his one. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL IN ORDER THAT 
A CRUCIAL DEFENSE WITNESS COULD RECUPERATE SUFFICIENTLY TO ATTEND 
TRIAL. 
The Court expressed its concern for a quick resolution of this 
case after a mistrial had been declared in the December 5-6 trial. 
It was not, however, predictable that Mrs. Meinhart, a vital alibi 
witness would have the surgery which confined her to her home. 
Defendant requested a continuance for sufficient time to allow 
her to recover and testify personally, but the court insisted that 
a deposition be taken from Mrs. Meinhart and admitted at trial. 
The jury was therefore deprived of the opportunity of seeing, 
hearing, and evaluating the conviction, the demeanor, and the 
credibility of Mrs. Meinhart. The testimony came before the jury 
by way of Mrs. Meinhart's granddaughter, Rachelle Schow, reading 
the part while counsel for the state and the defendant read the 
respective questions which were asked. 
The importance of face to face contact between a witness and 
a jury has already been mentioned, United States v. Benfield, 
supra. In this case, where there was a total conflict in the 
testimony of the state's witnesses and the defendant's witnesses, 
the result was dependent totally on the jury's evaluation of the 
credibility of those witnesses, particularly as the state relied 
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heavily on the testimony of an accomplice who had been offered 
leniency in exchange for testimony. Any diminution of the impact 
of a witness's testimony diluted defendant's chance for a fair 
trial in this matter. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 25, A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TRUNK OF THE CAR 
ALLEGEDLY USED TO TRANSPORT THE STOLEN PROPERTY. 
As has been previously stated, the state relied heavily on the 
testimony of on Brian Winslow, an individual who admittedly 
participated in all of the alleged burglaries and thefts, but who 
blamed the defendant for instigating, planning, and directing the 
crimes. The accomplice testified that four full-sized garbage 
sacks of stolen property were placed in the trunk of a 1980 Ford 
Mustang. (TR. 246-246) At trial, the wife of the defendant, 
Vickie Horton, testified that she took a photograph of the trunk 
of the mustang. (TR.309-310) That photograph (Exhibit 25) showed 
the rear of the vehicle, the back of the trunk, and a fourteen inch 
hubcap leaning on the edge of the trunk for perspective. The 
hubcap showed that the trunk was extremely shallow and thus that 
it would have been impossible for the quantity of stolen items 
described to have fit. The state objected to the introduction of 
the exhibit on the grounds that the bottom of the hubcap was not 
visible. It might be possible that something was sitting under it 
to distort the perspective. (TR. 311) Despite further foundation 
from the witness that there was nothing under the hubcap, and that 
the trunk was about nine inches deep (as indicated by the 
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comparison to the hubcap) the trial court refused to admit the 
proposed exhibit. At least one state's witness (Officer Boren) had 
participated in the search of the defendant's home and the trunk 
of the mustang (Finding 15), so the state had an awareness that the 
testimony concerning the nine inch depth was truthful. Despite 
this knowledge, the court's ruling allowed the state to appeal to 
the jury's common knowledge that there could not be only a nine 
inch trunk. Counsel for the state specifically stated in argument 
"We know it is impossible." (TR. 400-401) The failure to admit the 
photograph of the trunk therefore opened the door to a false 
argument to the jury, but also allowed the state to argue 
forcefully that Mrs Horton was a liar and could not be truthful in 
any of her testimony including the alibi evidence that she 
presented. 
It is clear that photographs are admissible evidence in a 
trial if they have probative value and if they are not inflammatory 
or prejudicial in nature to a degree that their probative value is 
outweighed. The cumulative effect of photographic evidence is also 
to be considered. State v. Laffertv, 749 P 2d. 1239, (Utah 1988). 
Courts outside of Utahs have also ruled on the reasons for 
admitting photographs. Photographs have been held to be relevant 
to illustrate how a crime was committed and to corroborate a 
witness' testimony. State v. Montes, 667 P. 2d 191 (Ariz. 1983). 
Generally, a photograph may be admitted even though its subject 
matter may be introduced into evidence in words. People v. 
Loscutoff, 661 P. 2d 274 (Colo., 1983). Photographs may be 
18 
admitted if it would be helpful to permit a witness to supplement 
his description by their use. People v. Mattas, 618 P. 2d 675 
(Colo., 1980). The proper test for admission of reconstructed 
photographs of scenes is whether conditions are the same or 
substantially similar to the events depicted; minor differences go 
to the weight of the evidence rather than to the admissibility. 
State v. Kendig, 666 P 2d. 233 (Kansas, 1983). In this case, where 
a proper foundation was laid, the objection of the State should 
have been argued as weight rather thatn admissibility. 
While it is true that the trial judges have great discretion 
in ruling what evidence is admissible at trial, and while those 
rulings are not to be disturbed absent clear error (State v. Gray, 
717 P. 2d 1313 [Utah 1986]) an abuse of discretion should still be 
examined. The offered photograph was relevant in that it tended 
to disprove the state's prime witness. It was probative. It was 
not inflammatory in any way. It was not cumulative. It merely 
showed the state's primary witness to be a liar. Its exclusion 
from consideration by the jury was clearly erroneous. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO SEVEN 
CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS AND A CONSECUTIVE JAIL SENTENCE. 
At the time of sentencing, the court was made aware of the 
statutory provision at Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 401(4). 
Despite that awareness, and despite the clear language of the 
statute the court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences. 
At the time of sentencing, the court was not made aware of this 
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court's decision in State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1991). 
Neither counsel also was aware of the decision at the time of 
sentencing. At the time of the writing of this brief, defendant's 
counsel became aware of the case. The defendant concedes upon 
examination of that case that it seems to be determinative. The 
defendant therefore only seeks a clarification from this court that 
the maximum time served should be 30 years and the minimum be one 
year in accordance with the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits to the court that the admission of the 
illegally seized evidence, the non-admission of the alibi 
testimony, the non-admission of the photograph, and the failure to 
allow the defendant's alibi witness to recover for trial all 
constitutes reversible error. Appellant therefore submits that 
his conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 2Jj~ day of JuAx. , 
1 9 9 2 . 
ndU^ fti bJiulu^ 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing brief of appellant to Paul Van Dam, Utah 
State Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84114 on this 2>{Jr day of J_ 
vi\y ' 1992-
dub,.. tti lj.JlnuJ^ 
Alan M. Williams 
ADDENDUM 
Title 76, Chapter 
Title 76, Chapter 
Findings of Facts 
6, Section 404, 
6, Section 202, 
and Conclusions 
Utah Code Annotated 
Utah Code Annotated 
of Law 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny 
10. 
c # j # g. _ 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 4. 
A.L.R- — What amounts to "exclusive" pos-
session of stolen goods to support inference of 
burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A L.R. 
3d 727. 
Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 12. 
6-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single oftense embrac-
e/the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny 
fiyjtrick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, black-
mail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by 
** ence that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 
ugh 76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by 
iting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the 
l&fense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
Blistory: <J. 11*63, 76-6-403, enacted by L. 
|§73, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 17. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
idence. 
(eading and practice, 
siving stolen property. 
i d e n c e . 
ngerprint evidence, based on a comparison 
. defendants fingerprints with those found at 
ie? scene of the crime, along with the testi-
ibny of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient 
evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary 
&nd theft. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1985). 
Pleading and practice. 
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of 
theft" required to be pled by this section to in-
voke the provisions of consolidated theft. Once 
the prosecution charges a defendant with the 
general offense of "theft*' under § 76-6-404, it 
may then present its evidence to prove the 
theft was committed in any manner specified 
in §§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 
745 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen 
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of theft without the necessity 
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor, 
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
cial anti-theft laws, §§ 41-1-105 to 14-1-121. 
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq 
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76-6-201 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal-
Mischief § 1. Mischief or Damage to Property § 3. 
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief «» 1. 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L. Cross-References. —- Civil provisions, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. entry and detainer, § 78-36-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary What is "building" or "house" within bur-
§ 1. glary or breaking and entering statute, 68 
C.J.S. — 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 2. A.L.R.4th 425. 
A.L.R. — Maintainability of burglary Key Numbers. — Burglary «=» 1. 
charge, where entry into building is made with 
consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
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HARRY H. SOUVALL #4919 
Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 781-0770 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, : AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
VS. : MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT 
AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
WILLIAM GENE HORTON, : 
CASE NO. 911800036 FS 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on the 7th day of 
November, 1991 on Defendant's Motion To Quash Warrant and Exclude 
Evidence. The Plaintiff was represented by Harry Souvall, Uintah 
County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, Alan M. Williams. Also present was Defendant, Dennis 
Session, who was represented by his attorney, Keith Chiara. The 
Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully apprised thereof issues the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DISTHIUI w u n . 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
F EB 141992 
CK. CLERK 
DEPUTY 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
action, as this is a Motion To Suppress filed pursuant to Rule 
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. On or about the 16th day of June, 1991, the Dinah Bowl 
Bowling Alley in Vernal and two shops located therein, The Acute 
Cut and The Dinah Barber Salon, were also broken into and thefts 
occurred in each of the respective businesses. 
3. On or about July 8, 1991, Detective Joe Boren of the 
Vernal City Police Department, received a phone call from a 
confidential informant, who asked not to be identified. This 
informant stated to Officer Boren that they had information 
regarding the burglary of the bowling alley in Vernal, which had 
recently been broken into. The caller then asked if a business 
in Duchesne had been broken into, where VCR's had been taken. 
Detective Boren testified that the caller stated that he or she 
had overheard a conversation between Vickie and Billy Horton. 
During this conversation, the caller overheard Billy Horton say 
that he had broken into the Vernal bowling alley. The caller 
also overheard Billy Horton say something about VCR's from 
Duchesne. The caller then advised Detective Boren that the 
suspect, Billy Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison 
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about one year ago. The suspect was described as being between 
the ages of 35 and 38. The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford 
Mustang, Utah License Number 101AKE, to the Vernal area to commit 
the crimes. The caller further informed Detective Boren that 
the suspect had been convicted of several burglaries in the past. 
The caller further informed Officer Boren that the suspect 
resides at 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. Detective Boren was able to locate a drivers license 
issued to William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Detective Boren was also able to obtain a criminal 
history on William Gene Horton and said criminal history revealed 
several arrests and convictions for burglary and other crimes. 
5. Detective Boren further testified that later on the same 
day, he received a phone call from the informant. The informant 
stated the suspect had been in possession of several boxes of 
video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCR's and several boxes of 
packaged meat. The informant further stated that the suspect had 
been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes. The 
informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may 
have been involved with the burglaries and stated that they would 
call back with information if they were able to obtain the same. 
6. Detective Boren further testified that about three hours 
later, also on July 8, 1991, he received another call from the 
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same informant. The informant stated that they thought the other 
suspect was named Steven. The informant further stated that the 
suspect lived in Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton. 
The informant further described the second suspect as "blonde, 
stocky build, married with one child". 
7. Detective Boren testified that at approximately 22:30 
hours on the aforementioned date, he received another phone call 
from the informant. The informant stated the second suspect's 
name was Brian - not Steven. The informant further stated that 
Brian had been released from prison and his child was 
approximately six months old. 
8. On or about the 9th day of July, 1991, Officer Boren 
contacted Brent Cardall of the Department of Corrections. 
Cardall reported that he only had two Brians listed in his office 
- Brian Harris from California and Brian Winslow. Brian Winslow 
had been in the Utah State Prison and had been released in March 
of 1990. Brent Cardall described Brian Winslow as "blonde, 
stocky build and having one child approximately six months old". 
Mr. Cardall further relayed that Brian winslow had an extensive 
criminal history, including the crime of burglary and other 
property crimes against a person. 
9. On July 9, 1991, at approximately 14:00 hours, Officer 
Boren received a call from the informant. The informant stated 
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that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow. The 
informant further advised Officer Boren that Billy Horton was in 
Vernal and was staying with Winslow for the next two or three 
days. 
10. Based upon the above informationf Officer Boren 
obtained a Search Warrant on the 10th day of July from the Third 
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and from the Eighth Circuit 
Court in Vernal to search the homes of William Gene Horton and 
Brian Winslow. The search of William Horton1s home uncovered 
evidence that appeared to have been taken from Dinah Bowl, The 
Acute Cut, and Wilkerson's in Duchesne. 
11. After being read his Miranda rights, Co-Defendant, 
Brian Winslow, confessed to the crimes and implicated the 
Defendant, William Horton, Dennis Sessions and Vickie Horton as 
participants in either the first set of burglaries on May 26, 
1991 and the second set of burglaries on June 15, 1991 and June 
16, 1991. Mr. Winslow's confession and information regarding Mr. 
Horton's involvement in the crime were received by the officer 
after the warrant had been executed on the Horton residence 
12. Detective Boren states that he had information from the 
informant that the items identified as stolen property were seen 
in the driveway of the William Horton residence, but he failed to 
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include that information in the Affidavit of Probable Cause to 
obtain the Search Warrant for the residence of William G. Horton. 
13. At the Hearing, Officer Boren testified that the reason 
this information was not included was that the specific place and 
time of when the property was seen in the driveway could have 
been used to identify the informant if the Defendant had that 
information. Therefore, the fact that the stolen property was 
seen in the driveway of William Horton's residence was excluded 
from the Affidavit. 
14. Officer Boren is an experienced officer with the search 
warrant process. He has drafted or assisted in the drafting of 
at least two hundred search warrant affidavits. He is familiar 
with the requirements for stating in the affidavit the location 
of the suspected contraband, and the factual basis for the 
request to search in that location. Officer Boren knew that he 
had left out that information in his affidavit. 
15. Officer Boren invited several officers who were 
investigating burglaries, which were not mentioned in the search 
warrantf to accompany him in the execution of the search warrant 
knowing that each officer's purpose was to search for items from 
those unrelated and unidentified burglaries. Officer Boren 
allowed this despite his knowledge that there was nothing in his 
affidavit or warrant that mentioned those burglaries. 
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16. Officer Boren included, in his list of suspected 
contraband attached to his affidavit/ several items which had 
been taken during burglaries other than the ones described in the 
affidavit. 
17. Officer Boren withheld information which he had 
concerning the relationship of the informer to the defendant 
which may have had substantial impact on the determination of the 
credibility of that informant. He also withheld other details 
given to him by the informant. 
18. While Officer Boren had information which stated that 
contraband had been seen in the driveway of the Horton residence, 
he did not present any evidence as to when that evidence was seen 
nor if it was still there. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Affidavit in support of the warrant did not contain 
information as to why the property seized would be found at the 
William G. Horton residence and, therefore, there was 
insufficient probable cause, is a matter of law, to establish a 
probable cause for a search. 
2. The information received from the informant is 
sufficiently reliable and was verified by Officer Boren to be 
relied upon in the issuance of a warrant. Furthermore, there was 
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sufficient probable cause, based upon the information, to believe 
that William G. Horton had committed the crimes. 
3. Officer Boren withheld the necessary information to 
establish a nexus between the crime and the stolen property being 
at his residence because he was attempting to protect the 
identification of an informant. Had the information been 
included in the affidavit, there would have been sufficient 
probable cause to search the residence. The officer was acting 
in good faith in the request for a warrant and the execution of 
the warrant and the Court upholds the search under the Good Faith 
Exception search rule requirement established by the United 
States Supreme Court in The United States v. Leon. 
DATED this /<j&Aday of February, 1992. 
(\ J&**teo <2— 
DENNIS L. DRANEY 
District Court Judge 
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